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ABSTRACT
We examine how the behavior of software developers changes in re-
sponse to removing gamification elements from GitHub, an online
platform for collaborative programming and software development.
We find that the unannounced removal of daily activity streak coun-
ters from the user interface (from user profile pages) was followed
by significant changes in behavior. Long-running streaks of activ-
ity were abandoned and became less common. Weekend activity
decreased and days in which developers made a single contribu-
tion became less common. Synchronization of streaking behavior
in the platform’s social network also decreased, suggesting that
gamification is a powerful channel for social influence. Focusing
on a set of software developers that were publicly pursuing a goal
to make contributions for 100 days in a row, we find that some of
these developers abandon this quest following the removal of the
public streak counter. Our findings provide evidence for the signifi-
cant impact of gamification on the behavior of developers on large
collaborative programming and software development platforms.
They urge caution: gamification can steer the behavior of software
developers in unexpected and unwanted directions.
1 INTRODUCTION
Online platforms often employ gamification elements to increase
user participation and to steer user behavior in desired directions.
Points, badges, and leaderboards are known to encourage people
to spend more time interacting with a system [33]. These elements
also play an important role in building user reputation and trust in a
community. The points and tokens users earn sometimes have value
beyond the platform in question, for instance as credentials in the
labor market. A good gamification system can grow user engage-
ment and increase social interaction and collaboration. However
gamification can also steer users astray by promoting narrowly de-
fined goals and encouraging unreasonable levels of activity. These
potential downsides present especially pressing problems when the
platform has significant social and economic implications for its
users.
It is important to understand the influence of gamification on
user behavior because it has spread to all corners of the web. Ecom-
merce sellers on sites like Ebay collect references to signal their
trustworthiness [12]. Freelance workers covering a wide range of
industries from digital design to food delivery display badges of
accomplishments on their personal profiles [34, 60]. Gamification
is also used by governments to nudge their citizens towards better
decisions [8] and by educators to guide their students to better
learning outcomes [16]. Yet gamification is no silver bullet: studies
have shown that poorly designed games can sap motivation [35, 74]
and reorient effort toward chasing metrics rather than substantive
outcomes [12]. When games are used to rank people at work, the
high stakes can lead to overwork and interpersonal conflict [62].
Gamification is especially prevalent on platforms used by soft-
ware engineers for collaborative work [55]. Two distinguished ex-
amples are Stack Overflow [3], a large Q&A community for pro-
gramming related knowledge, and GitHub [68], the largest forum
for collaboration in open source software. Gamification plays an
important role in open source software because its tradition of
decentralized, online collaboration [14] creates a demand for ways
to effectively signal commitment, competence, and trustworthi-
ness [69].
The promise of gamification on online platforms in general, and
for open source software communities in particular, then, is to in-
crease participation and trust among users. It accomplishes this
by rewarding particular kinds of actions and highlighting mile-
stones and successes of a user’s career. A vast literature of obser-
vational [53] and experimental [31] studies suggests that gamifica-
tion works in a narrow sense: users respond to these rewards by
changing their behavior [33], and revert to previous patterns when
gamification is removed [67]. But as we have noted, just because
gamification does steer user behavior, does not mean that the re-
sulting behavior is desirable. Nor does gamification work the same
way for everyone: some individuals may genuinely enjoy gamifi-
cation, but others may “feel a compulsion [to participate] when
the system pulls on psychological levers such as social comparison
or rewards” [41]. In general the negative effects of gamification
elements are understudied in the literature [36], especially among
software developers [55].
In this paper we demonstrate the behavioral affects of gamifica-
tion on software developers by studying individuals contributing
to GitHub and a quasi-experiment involving the design of the plat-
form. In May 2016 GitHub removed, without warning or official
announcement, two counters from developer profiles that tracked
their current and all-time longest streaks of uninterrupted daily
contributions. As the change was exogenous, the change in behav-
ioral traces of developers across this change contains more precise
information about their relation to gamification than one can typ-
ically capture with observational studies [17, 46]. And because it
happened “live”, on a platform used by hundreds of thousands of
people every day, these insights are likely more generalizable than
those derived from lab experiments.
We use this setting to test the following research questions re-
lating developer behavior and gamification.
• RQ1: Did developer streaking behavior change significantly
after the design change?
• RQ2: Did the timing and distribution of developer activity
change?
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• RQ3: Did developers use the counters to set and achieve
personal goals?
• RQ4: Was there a significant change in the correlation of
streaking behavior in the social network?
These questions serve as a framework to evaluate how gamified
streak counters on GitHub affected developer behavior. They also
help us diagnose whether or not the counters were effective, both in
the sense that they fostered certain kinds of behavior and whether
that behavior was, in fact, desirable. To address them, we compiled
a database of developers active around the site design change. We
observe their activities overtime to record the lengths of uninter-
rupted streaks of daily activity. We analyze the distribution of these
streak lengths and activity in general across the change using a
variety of methods. This approach exploits the idea that sudden
changes in activity patterns related to streaking in the aftermath of
the design change are highly suggestive of gamified behavior.
Our analysis suggests that the removal of the counters was fol-
lowed by several changes in developer behavior. First we document
that many long streaks ongoing at the time of the change are aban-
doned. In the long term, there are significantly fewer long streaks.
This overall change in behavior manifested in particular ways that
suggest that the counters were steering behavior in undesirable
ways. For instance, developer activity decreased on weekends com-
pared to weekdays, suggesting that the counters were pushing
developers to contribute on days they would have otherwise rested.
We also find that developers were less likely to make a single con-
tribution in a day after the change, suggesting that developers
had previously been consciously maintaining their counters. We
speculate that contributions made for the sake of a streak do not
represent highly productive work. Finally, we find that the ten-
dency for neighbors in the social network to synchronize in their
streaking behavior fell significantly after the change. This suggests
that developers were pulled to maintain streaks by peer effects.
These findings provide insight into how gamification changes
developer behavior on an important online platform, especially in
potentially negative ways. For example, streak-chasing behavior
likely had unhealthy externalities on the quality of developer out-
puts - evidenced by the phenomenon of single contribution days.
Though GitHub has removed this particular feature, the lessons we
can learn from this particular gamification design can help platform
owners design better features in the future.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section we review related work on gamification. We intro-
duce some general findings about the effectiveness of gamification
and the different ways it steers human behavior. We then discuss
previous work on gamification in the context of computer program-
ming and software development.
2.1 Gamification and Motivation
Gamification seems to appear wherever people have meaningful
social or economic interactions online. Some kinds of gamification,
for example feedback ratings or reputation points, can help grow
trust in a community [7]. Gamification is also used by platforms
to increase the frequency, duration, and intensity of user engage-
ment [45, 58]. These goals can be applied to virtuous ends, for
example improving educational outcomes among students [15], but
can also lead to negative outcomes. It can misdirect effort and incent
dishonesty [72] or lead to overwork or burnout [4]. Gamification
can commodify labor by facilitating the monitoring of workers [48].
Different implementations of gamification have varying effects
on user behavior. Some of this heterogeneity comes from the design
of the gamification element in question. For instance leaderboards,
which publicly rank users over the course of a project or task, seem
to drive competitive behavior as relative performance becomes
more important [44]. Users tend to temporarily alter their behavior
in order to collect badges, tokens which users can display after
completing a specified activity [3, 22]. On many platforms badges
are valuable both for their signal that a user has accomplished a
feat, and to grant the user special privileges.
An important recognition is that not all users are equally inter-
ested in engaging with gamified elements. In one study on a plat-
form some users are eager to collect points, others are happy with
a more moderate scores, while others are totally uninterested [21].
Several papers have shown that social and cultural effects influence
an individual’s propensity to respond to gamification [1, 71].
Previous works explain the adoption of gamified elements by
users by probing how they activate or amplify psychological mo-
tivations. Some users chase gamified elements for their value as
a signal. Others use gamified elements to set goals, either in rela-
tion to their own previous outcomes [2] or in competition with
others [44]. Some people may pursue points to imitate others [32].
Several studies show how gamification can exploit motivations in
ways that lead to bad outcomes [35, 41].
2.2 Gamification in Software Development
As mentioned in the introduction, online communities relating to
software development and computer programming tend to have a
significant gamification footprint. Collaborative work on software
naturally takes place in an online context and the open source
software community in particular is highly geographically dis-
persed [27, 57]. As a result, a significant share of interactions takes
place on social platforms [63]. Trust and reputation are important in
these contexts, suggesting that gamified elements have a significant
role to play in this community.
As software development is a quickly changing labor market,
non-standard credentials are often used to evaluate job candidates
and potential collaborators. For example, instead of first consider-
ing an individual’s employment history, college degrees, or self-
described programming language experience, a hiring manager
may prefer to check out an individual’s profile on a platform like
GitHub [47]. The signals sent by a few key markers on these profiles
can make a big first impression. Indeed, eye-tracking experiments
confirm that visitors to a new profile page dwell on counters, badges,
and statistics [24]. In this way, the way in which a developer’s his-
tory of contributions is represented can have significant impact on
how they are evaluated in the future.
The above-mentioned potential negative side-effects of gamifica-
tion are especially important in the software development commu-
nity. On the one hand, open source software communities arewidely
used throughout the digital economy, often in mission-critical set-
tings [20]. On the other, the people in this community are often
2
How Gamification Affects Software Developer Preprint, June 2020,
Figure 1: Example of a GitHub user profile’s activity data, prior toMay 19th, 2016. On that date an unannounced design change
removed the two highlighted counters, tracking the lengths of the developer’s longest and current streaks of daily activity.
Source: https://zachholman.com/posts/streaks/
working long hours, multitasking between many projects [70], and
are highly stressed [56], sometimes leading to burnout and project
abandonment [52]. Because it is difficult to evaluate the quality of
contributions to software projects in general, gamification can only
set goals that proxy for quality in this context. This presents the
risk that gamified software developers chase metrics or optimize be-
havior in ways that correlate with but do not cause good outcomes.
It is imperative that the research community better understands
the extent to which gamification can cause harm.
One example of a platform relating to software development
with a significant gamification aspect is Stack Overflow, the largest
Q&A platform for questions about computer programming. Several
previous studies describe how Stack Overflow users engage with
gamification. For instance, users will significantly change their
behavior when they are close to obtaining a so-called threshold
badge [3], returning to old habits soon after. Over the course of its
history, Stack Overflow has introduced several new badges - often
leading to sudden changes in behavior observable at the macro
scale as users chase these new tokens [11].
3 DATA
In this section we describe GitHub’s gamified elements and the
sudden removal of one of these elements in 2016. We then describe
how we collected, filtered, and processed the data for the purposes
of our analysis. The data and code used to perform this filtering are
available at https://github.com/lukasmoldon/GHStreaksThesis.
3.1 Gamification on GitHub
GitHub has had several gamification elements on its site. As of 2020,
developer profiles are still adorned with a contribution calendar
- a visual representation of the daily intensity of their activity on
the site in the last year. Previously GitHub included two counters
below each developer’s calendar, one reporting the developer’s all-
time longest streak of consecutive days making a contribution on
GitHub, and the other reporting the developer’s ongoing streak.
We share an example in Figure 1.
This external shock, which we interpret as a quasi-experimental
perturbation of gamification on GitHub, serves as the lynch-pin
of our analysis. We study changes in behavior relating to streaks
around this date assuming that they are at least partially made in
response to the removal of the counters. For instance, we will soon
observe that there was a significant drop in the number of long
streaks that were active shortly following the design change. We
interpret this as a response: developers suddenly lost an incentive
to maintain their streaks and adjusted their behavior in response.
Besides the counters and the still-present activity calendar, we
note that GitHub also has gamification elements in the form of
badges for projects. Previous work has demonstrated that project
owners seek out these badges, and that projects in turn are evaluated
more favorably when they have them [68].
3.2 Data processing
Our primary data source for GitHub data is GHTorrent, an updating
database of information retrieved from the GitHub REST API [29].
We access data from the June 2019 dump. The data set contains
32.5 million developers, 125 million projects, 100 million opened
issues and 1.368 billion unique commits. To address our research
questions we proceeded to filter and modify the data.
As our primary focus is the platform’s design change, we only
consider developers who were active on the site around the time
of the change. From the original population, we discarded all de-
velopers who did not have a commit in a non-forked repository
(17.3 million remaining). We also removed developers with more
than 100 invalid commit timestamps to filter developers who may
have manipulated their activity histories and bot accounts. Bots
make a significant number of contributions, so it is important to
filter them out carefully. Our end sample excludes over 99% of the
bots identified in a recent paper on GitHub bot detection, which
3
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Figure 2: Share of developers having a streak of length > t days for t ∈ {20, 60, 200}: One of the largest drops occurs right after
the streak counters were removed from GitHub (red line). Developers tend to abandon their streaks across holidays season
(dotted lines). Server outages also influence streaks. (dashed lines).
we discovered after our analyses were completed [18]. We kept the
remaining developers who had at least 100 commits, were assigned
a “USR” type (excluding organization accounts), and who had an
associated geolocation from GHTorrent, leaving 433,138 developers.
We focus on developers which are geolocated for a technical reason.
To accurately track daily activity streaks, it is necessary to know a
developer’s timezone as every timestamp is converted and saved in
UTC-0 by GitHub, but streaks are evaluated by local time zones. For
example, without knowing that a developer lives in San Francisco,
their commit at 8PM local time on a Monday would be incorrectly
evaluated as a commit on a Tuesday (3AM in UTC-0). These coordi-
nates are inferred by GHTorrent, using the location free text field
on developer profiles and the OpenStreetMap API. More than 85%
of developers in this population joined GitHub before the design
change.
Next we proceeded to tabulate the daily activities of each devel-
oper in order to recreate the streak counters they had on each day.
Three kinds of contributions counted towards streaks: commits,
pull requests and issues. There were some specific rules for these
activities to count 1. For instance, contributions had to be associ-
ated with a standalone (non-forked) project. For pull requests and
issues, we checked if they were made in a forked repository and
filter such activity out. However, because 48 million projects repre-
sent a forked copy of a corresponding standalone project, commits
are assigned to projects 6.252 billion times. Whenever a project is
1 https://help.GitHub.com/en/articles/why-are-my-contributions-not-showing-up-
on-my-profile (September 28, 2019)
forked, all commits of this origin standalone project are duplicated
and assigned to the forked project copy, too. In this case we had
to discard commits to forks which were never merged back to the
original project. We created filtered databases for each contribution
type for all observed developers.
The remaining dataset consists of 433,138 developers with over
290 million valid contributions (including 12.8 million issues and
pull requests). In the last step, all contributions were sorted by time
and developer. We computed the resulting data set of streaks (start,
end) assigned to the corresponding developer ID.
4 ANALYSIS
Our overarching empirical strategy is to describe how developer
behavior differs across the design change. We view the removal of
the counters as a shock: developers did not anticipate this change.
As a result, we interpret changes in developer activity relating to
streaking across the change as evidence for the effect of gamification
on behavior.
4.1 RQ1: Changes in Developer Behavior
We first address the question of whether or not we can observe
significant changes in overall behavior. We begin by introducing
general findings about the share of streaking developers over time.
Afterwards we consider the distributions of streaks starting on
Mondays and compare the lengths of such streaks before and after
the design change.
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We calculated the share of all observed developers having a
streak with a minimum length of 20, 60 and 200 days for each
day. Note that to compute these values we count streaks for each
group (t =20, 50, 200) from the day they passed the threshold t
not from the day they were started. This emphasizes the impact of
events such as holidays or service outages. As we are calculating
the share of developers with an ongoing streak, we divide the count
of such developers by the number of developers in our dataset
who had registered at least t − 1 days before. This adjusts for the
growing population of GitHub developers over time. The resulting
plot (Figure 2) shows that the largest drop of streaking developers
within 3 years happened immediately after the 19th of March in
2016. Moreover, we observe a long-term decline in the share of
developers on long streaks. However, developers having streaks
longer than 200 days did not change their behavior directly after
the change.
We can make two qualitative interpretations from this analysis.
First, we note that many of the sudden drops in streaking behavior
around holidays or outages witness a subsequent, quite symmet-
ric recovery roughly t days later. This suggests that there is some
natural base rate of streaking. The second is that the decline in
streaking in the immediate aftermath of the design change is some-
what more gradual than the other major declines observed around
major holidays or platform outages. We interpret this as a popula-
tion of developers giving up their streaks gradually in response to
the design change.
Figure 3 focuses on the share of developers with an ongoing
streak of length t = 20, with developers broken up by their country
of origin. We use the same geolocation of developers which we
use to make time-zone adjustments. We find that while western
countries are equally affected by the design change, Chinese devel-
opers continue streaking on a similar level (with one temporary
drop across the US Independence Day). One explanation could be
that Chinese developers often have significantly more demanding
working hours than their counterparts in the Western world. This
interpretation is supported by recent protests against long working
hours on GitHub by Chinese developers and their supporters [73].
We also note that the intensity of the decline in streaks across the
design change is similar for all four countries.
To test the statistical significance of the change in share of de-
velopers streaking, we zoom in on activity right around the change.
We compare the lengths of streaks starting exactly three weeks
before the design change with those starting exactly three weeks
after the change. A Mann-Whitney-U test indicates that the for-
mer collection of streak lengths has a significantly higher average,
significant at p < .01. We then focus on Mondays to compare the
characteristic lengths of streaks around the design change because
of the well-documented “Monday Effect” [28], which notes that a
significant amount of contributions to GitHub take place on Mon-
days. We report characteristic streak lengths on various Mondays
around the removal of the counters in Table 1, the likelihood that
they last more than a week, as well as odds of a streak lasting more
than 14 days conditional on reaching a 7 days.
Considering the change in streaking behavior in the long run,
we compare all streaks beginning on Mondays of the first ten weeks
in 2016, before the design change, with those from 2017. We plot
the truncated survival curves of streaks in Figure 4. These curves
Figure 3: Share of developers from different countries hav-
ing a streak of length > 20 days: While western countries
are affected equally by the design change, developers from
China continue streaking afterwards on a similar level.
describe the chance that a streak starting in a given weeks survives
t days. The clear separation of most red curves, representing weeks
in early 2017, from the blue curves, representing the first weeks
from 2016, suggests that a change has taken place. Indeed, we note
that the average length of a streak exceeding 14 days declined from
nearly 26 days in early 2016 to 22 days in early 2017. At extreme
values the change is even more drastic: among streaks of length at
least 14, those started in early 2016 were more than twice as likely
to exceed 100 days (4.4%) than those started in early 2017 (2.0%).
In summary, we found evidence that long streaks were aban-
doned following the design change, and that new streaks became
significantly less common. The difference in frequency of streaks
becomes larger as we consider longer streaks. We see evidence
for this effect when we zoom in on the weeks around the design
change, and when we compare activity across one year.
Starting date Avg length P(len >7) P(len >14 | len >7)
2016/04/18 2.38 0.52% 15%
2016/04/25 2.29 0.40% 10%
2016/05/02 2.24 0.40% 11%
2016/05/09 2.36 0.43% 7%
2016/05/16 2.33 0.45% 9%
Change - - -
2016/05/23 2.30 0.39% 9%
2016/05/30 2.27 0.40% 6%
2016/06/06 2.27 0.31% 5%
2016/06/13 2.24 0.27% 1%
2016/06/20 2.28 0.35% 3%
Table 1: Comparison of streaks starting on variousMondays
around the site design change. The sharper decrease in the
probability of long streaks suggests a loss of interest in be-
havior tracked by the counters removed in the change.
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Figure 4: Share of streaks surviving at least x days. Each line
represents the survival curve of streaks started in one of the
first tenweeks of either 2016 (blue) or 2017 (red).We observe
a clear separation - the lower position of the red curves indi-
cates that in 2017, after the site design change, long streaks
became less common.
4.2 RQ2: Changes in Timing and Distribution
of Activity
Having demonstrated that there is a significant change in streaking
behavior following the design change, we now turn to our second
question, asking whether the timing and distribution of developer
activity changed. We consider two ways in which developer activity
may have changed qualitatively. The first is that developers may
be more likely to take a break from the platform on weekends. We
find evidence of a small but significant drop in the relative share of
activity on the weekends. The second is that developers no longer
have incentive to make contributions for the sake of extending an
ongoing streak. We also find evidence for this phenomenon.
4.2.1 Weekend Activity. Even though a significant share of open
source development activity occurs on nights and weekends [13],
weekends are considered a time to rest and spend with friends and
family in most cultures around the world. Moreover, sociologists
have documented that time is a networked good [75], meaning that
time for work or recreation is more valuable when it is synchronized
with the time of others. Without the incentive to extend a long
ongoing streak, we argue that developers will be more likely to
take time off on the weekends.
We present descriptive statistics of the relative share of developer
contributions before and after the change in Table 2. We see that
the share of activity on the weekend drops among all developers
drops ( .09%), and moreso for those developers who achieve long
streaks (.28-.34%). To test the statistical significance of this change,
we build a model.
In the following we focus on active developers with at least 30
contributions in the respective time interval. To test for statistical
significance of the design change on weekend work, we apply the
regression discontinuity design method [37]. Our goal is to fit a
linear model on the share of weekend activity per developer over
time, which estimates the effect of the design change with a treated
variable and coefficient. The corresponding linear model is
y = β0 + β1 · x + β2 ·T
where y denotes the ratio of weekend activity for a developer in
week x and T represents the treated variable, with T = 0 if x is
before the change, T = 1 otherwise. We fit our model to the data
using the python module RDD 2. We fit the model with several
bandwidths, denoting the number of weeks we consider in total
before and after the week of the design change.
We report the results in Table 3. Whether we consider 1, 2, or 3
weeks before and after the design change (corresponding to band-
width values of 2, 4, and 6, respectively), we find that there was
a significant decrease in the number of contributions made on
weekends following the change.
Figure 5: Results of the RDDweekend placebo test with fake
change dates and bandwidth 4. The estimated treatment of
the actual design change on the share of weekend contribu-
tions is highlighted in red. All other points represent the re-
sult of repeating the same analysis with a hypothetical de-
sign change in other weeks. The green and yellow shaded
regions represent the 95% confidence intervals around the
estimated coefficient. Prior to the design change, no other
week saw such a large estimated treatment effect as the ac-
tual design change week.
In order to test the robustness of our findings, we carried out
a series of tests using the same model with the design change
artificially set to different dates in 2016. Such tests are known as
placebo tests in the econometrics literature [37]. To keep results
comparable, we again only focus on active developers with at least
30 contributions in the respective time interval and use bandwidth
4. Figure 5 shows the resulting treated coefficients for all tests
with the placebo date in week x . Before the change, we observe
no higher treated coefficient than the original one of -0.0365 and
larger 2.5% confidence intervals in general. After the change we
observe fluctuating coefficients around the Independence Day but
also similar values in September and October. We make two points
2https://GitHub.com/evan-magnusson/rdd (February 23, 2020)
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All Developers With Streak ≥ 20 With Streak ≥ 30
B A B A B A
Share of contrib. on weekends 0.2188 0.2179 0.2433 0.2399 0.2487 0.2459
Contrib. on weekends (millions) 45.3 48.6 13.5 10.3 9.5 7.6
Table 2: Share and total amount of weekend activity for all developers and only streaking developers (achieving a streak of
length 20 or 30 in the respective time interval) in the year before (B) and after (A) the change. The share of weekend work
decreases especially for streaking developers.
Bandwidth # Obs. β0 (intercept) β1 (x coeff.) β2 (treated coeff.) p-value β2
2 73433 0.0582 0.0358 -0.0985 <0.001
4 144726 0.1843 0.0050 -0.0365 <0.001
6 214249 0.2016 0.0004 -0.0241 <0.001
Table 3: Regression discontinuity design model estimates of the change in the share of activity carried out on the weekend.
The bandwidth column considers the number of weeks considered in total before and after the design change.
here: first, the fall in weekend work around the fourth of July
weekend seems to be compensated by overwork on neighboring
weekends. Second, all placebo points before the design change show
no difference as large as the real design change, suggesting that
this was in fact a significant change.
4.2.2 Single Contribution Days. Besides steering users to make
contributions on weekends, the counters likely exerted significant
pressure on users with long ongoing streaks. If this is the case, we
expect that users on long streaks before the change are significantly
more likely to have days in which they do the minimum activity
to extend their streak. We call such days Single Contribution Days
(SCD). In Figure 6, we plot the distribution of SCDs by streak-length
decile in streaks of length 60 or higher before vs. after the change.
We see that SCDs were more common before the change overall
(36% of days vs 32%). At the end of long streaks before the design
change, over 40% of days were SCD, compared with roughly 36%
after the change. We interpret this as evidence that developers went
out of their way to keep their long streaks alive.
4.3 RQ3: Counters for Goal-Setting
We have seen evidence that many developers stopped streaking
after the counters were removed, and that this reflected changing
patterns of contribution. These findings suggest that developers
were interested in the value of the counter for signaling purposes.
Another possible motivation for engaging with the counters was
that they could help developers set and stick to long term goals.
Indeed there are many resources offering to guide a learner to a
goal through a program of daily activity. One example in the world
of computer programming is the “100DaysOfCode” challenge 3. As
the name suggests, the challenge’s goal is to code at least one hour
a day for 100 days in a row. Participants are encouraged to fork a
GitHub repository, which serves as a journal template and can be
filled with daily individual progress updates. Though these daily
journal updates do not count as a valid contribution for the streak
counters as they are done in a forked repository, we assume that
the population of developers forking this repo is significantly more
3https://www.100daysofcode.com/
Figure 6: Share of days with one contribution by decile over
all streaks one year before and after the change with a min-
imum streak length of 60. Single Contribution Days are not
uniformly distributed and have a higher share at the end of
a streak. After the change this tendency weakens.
likely to engage in streaking behavior with goal-based motivations.
By observing this population across the change, we can check
whether the counters improved the chances that developers would
achieve their goal.
First we used the GitHub API to search for further goal based
communities on GitHub with similar 100 days of contributions
goals. The data we share online includes a list of the projects we
found. We also used the API to collect developers forking the cor-
responding template repositories and translates their usernames
to IDs in our database. From a collection of roughly 16,000 devel-
opers forking any one these projects, we found more than 1,600
developers in our filtered data (recall that our filtered dataset only
contains developers for which a location could be inferred). Fig-
ure 7 shows the daily share of these developers over time having a
streak of length t for t = 50, 100, 150. In the year before the change,
we observe a sharp increase in streaking with several drops (most
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likely caused by developers who reached their goal). But we also ob-
serve streaking beyond 150 days. Within the days after the change,
a large amount of developers stopped streaking immediately for
all thresholds t . Developers seem to be discouraged by the design
change and gave up their goal. However, we observe surviving and
new streaks longer than 50 days after the design change in 2017,
but with less developers participating compared to the year before.
The share of developers streaking above their goal over 150 days
decreased permanently. What is unclear from this figure is whether
the developers who are still streaking after the change reach their
goal of 100 days.
Figure 7: The streaking behavior of developers who forked a
code 100 days in a row-type GitHub project. The largest drop
in streaking behavior occurred immediately after the de-
sign change onGitHub (red line). Share of developers having
streaks above the 100 days goal decreased after the change
permanently.
Figure 8 plots the total number of developers achieving streaks
of length д ∈ {50, 100, 105, 155} over time. The design change
seems to have a low impact on these statistics, as many developers
still achieve significant streak lengths after the change. But when
comparing differences between the number of achievers of different
goals, we observe nearly the same increasing gap between achievers
of the 50 day/100 day real goal and achievers of 100 day/105 day
streaks. Thus, many developers stopped maintaining their streaks
right after hitting the 100 day goal, not even reaching a length of
105 days. These results suggest that developers still streak because
of the goal based challenge after the change, even without having
a streak feature. Moreover, the forked journal with daily updates
could have helped to keep track of a streak, as many developers
stop streaking quite exactly after reaching a length of 100 days.
This suggests that some developers did not need the counters to
achieve their goals.
4.4 RQ4: Imitation in the Social Network
GitHub, like many other online platforms for collaborative work,
includes a social network. Developers can follow each other and
receive updates about the activities of their network neighbors. It
is likely that developers visit the profiles of their friends in the
Figure 8: The streaking achievements of developers who
forked a code 100 days in a row-type GitHub project. Num-
ber of developers reaching streaks of length g days for g
∈ {50, 100, 105, 155} over time. The growth of g=50 achievers
decreases after the change, but developers still hit new goals.
The large difference between achievers of g=100 and g=105
emphasizes anchoring effect of the 100 day goal.
social network more often than those of other developers, and so
were more likely to observe the streak counters of their friends. In
this section we ask whether there is any evidence that developers
imitated their neighbors in streaking behavior. Observing such a
peer effect would demonstrate that gamification can modify devel-
opers behavior through social networks. Again we exploit the site
design change: we compare the correlation of streaking behavior
of network neighbors before and after the removal of counters.
Why dowe expect that gamification influenced behavior through
the social network? Observing the performance of familiar others
can inspire people to try harder. In fact, in seeking to evaluate and
benchmark our own performance, we often seek out information
about others [23]. In the context of gamification, in which points or
badges may seem arbitrary, a relative comparison seems essential
to define the value of rewards. Previous studies do find significant
correlations in engagement with gamification between developers
who are connected and can view each others’ outcomes [32]. It
is often unclear, however, whether these correlations are due to
sorting or influence.
Sorting, sometimes called homophily, refers to the phenomenon
that similar individuals are more likely to become friends. In the
case of GitHub, developers may be more likely to connect with
developers with similar work schedules or degree of motivation.
This latent similarity would explain similar degrees of streaking
behavior among connected developers. Influence, on the other hand,
refers to the tendency of friends to become more similar over time,
whether because of imitation, a desire to conform, or other social
forces. Developers on GitHub may be influenced by the activity
patterns of their neighbors. In the case of streaking behavior we
suggest that such influence was likely enhanced by the counters
present on developers profiles before the design change.
In general these two factors are confounded when conducting
observational studies [61]. For example, we cannot easily tell if two
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connected developers both have high streak scores because they are
influencing one another to work harder, or if they connected in the
first place because they are similarly dedicated to working. Yet the
removal of the streak counters presents an opportunity to partially
disentangle these effects, if it is interpreted as a quasi-experiment [5,
64]. Indeed, the removal of the counters likely suddenly blocked a
channel of influence between developers. If streaking is a behavior
transmitted by social influence, we would expect the correlation of
streaking behavior to fall significantly after the change.
Figure 9: This figure illustrates how we construct a network
of social connections of developers on GitHub to study net-
work correlations in streaking behavior. A) Developers on
GitHub can follow other developers to stay informed about
their activity. We represent developers as nodes and their
following relationships as links in a network. Some follow-
ing relationships are mutual. B) We keep only the mutual
connections as they aremost likely to represent connections
between peers and acquaintances. For any given day, we an-
notate each developer with the length of their current ongo-
ing streak.
To carry out this analysis, we generated a social network from
the time-stamped following relations stored by GHTorrent. In this
network, nodes represent developers while links between them are
mutual follower connections. Since we want to focus on ties be-
tween mutual acquaintances, we do not observe single/non-mutual
follows and discarded all nodes with a degree of 0. We visualize
filtering process used to generate the network that we analyze in
Figure 9. The resulting undirected network snapshot, realized for
May 18 in 2016 (the day before the design change) contains 146k
nodes and 253k links with an average degree < k >= 3.46 and a
maximum degree of kmax = 2343. The network is divided into 11k
components, while the largest component contains more than 81%
of all nodes.
We labeled nodes as streakers or non-streakers based on the
maximum streak length the developer had attained, for different
thresholds t ∈ {8, 15, 32}. If the maximum streak length of a de-
veloper is at least t days long, the developer is considered to be a
streaker, otherwise not. To calculate the correlation of streaking
status within the network we calculated Newman’s attribute as-
sortativity coefficient [54]). Generally speaking, the assortativity
of a network r is a real number in [−1, 1], increasing when neigh-
bors tend to have similar attribute values. To analyze the statistical
significant of streaking assortativity in the network, we repeat the
calculation of assortativity on 1,000 copies of the network in which
the streaking label is randomly shuffled. This randomization pre-
serves the network structure and overall prevalence of streaking.
We calculate a z-score comparing the observed assortativity with
the distribution of assortativity in the randomizations. As an al-
ternative measure of the tendency of streaking developers to be
connected, we also calculate a conditional probability: P(SN | S) =
P(node n has streaking neighbor | node n is streaker).
Table 4 shows that the streaker attribute is not randomly dis-
tributed, as we observe an assortativity around 0 for the randomized
networks and between 0.04 and 0.09 for the real network. We cal-
culated a z-score to test the statistical significance of the difference
in assortativity between the empirical graph and the random simu-
lated graphs, with z ≫ 1.96 for all tests. Values decrease with an
increasing streaker threshold t , since there are fewer streakers and
remaining streaking nodes have a higher fraction of non-streaking
neighbors. The conditional probability also suggests that there is
significant clustering of streaking developers in the network. The
probability that a streaker is connected to another streaker is 38.6%
compared to the average of 17.7% in the randomizations for t = 8.
With an increasing t the difference between the networks increases
too. At t = 32 we observe P(SN | S) = 25.3% compared an average
of 2.8% in the random networks.
This suggests that streaking developers are significantly inter-
connected, but does not tell us whether sorting or influence are
at play. If we repeat the analysis of homophily among streakers
after the change, we can test these factors. If only sorting is at play,
there should be no change in the observed assortativity levels. If
only influence is present, then there should be little or no assorta-
tivity remaining. Results in between suggest that both effects were
present before, and that the design change blocked an important
channel for influence. Indeed this is what we hypothesize: that
some developers were driven to extend their streaks because they
observed higher totals among their neighbors in the network, and
that the design change ended this phenomenon.
We thus created the same network one year after the change and
only observed streak records in these 12 months for the streaker
attribute. Besides 20k new existing nodes, there is an overall in-
crease of 13.4% in the number of edges and a general increase of
connectivity among nodes. Table 5 shows that streaking in the
network remains assortative and that post-change streakers are
still connected. But the overall values decreased compared with
the random networks, relative to what we observed in the network
from 2016. Smaller z-scores suggest a weaker level of streaking
assortativity after the change. For the threshold t = 8 only every
fourth developer is connected to another streaker, while one year
before we observed 38.6%. This suggests that the signals provided
by the streak counters were indeed a conduit for peer effects in the
social network of GitHub developers. The remaining assortativity
can likely be attributed to sorting.
5 DISCUSSION
Our use of a natural experiment on a widely-used online platform
offers a new perspective on some the main issues of gamification
research today [43]. Methodologically, our results are based on data
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(2016/05/18) real network random attr. networks (avg)
threshold t assortativity P(SN | S) assortativity P(SN | S) z-score (assortativity)
8 0.0886 0.3861 -0.0001 0.1787 41.6
15 0.0791 0.3402 -0.0001 0.0821 36.9
32 0.0448 0.2532 -0.0001 0.0271 21.2
Table 4: Network assortativity and the conditional probability that a streaker node has a streaking neighbor for the empirical
social network on 2016/05/18. We compare these values against their average values under 1,000 randomizations of the streak-
ing label. Both empirical differ significantly from the random experiments at all three thresholds we consider, indicating a
connection between streaking and the network structure.
(2017/05/20) real network random attr. networks (avg)
threshold t assortativity P(SN | S) assortativity P(SN | S) z-score (assortativity)
8 0.0911 0.2653 -0.0001 0.1402 37.7
15 0.0554 0.2031 0.0001 0.0471 22.6
32 0.0211 0.1118 -0.0001 0.0106 8.3
Table 5: Calculations repeated for the empirical network on 2017/05/20, one year after the removal of streak counters from
GitHub. We observe smaller but still significant clustering by streaking users, compared with the randomizations.
on the scale typical of observational studies, while retaining some
flavor of an experimental study (for instance that we can exclude
several confounding explanations for our findings such as a secular
change in behavior). Theoretically, our focus on the context of soft-
ware development on GitHub gives us a clearer lens through which
to interpret the interaction between developer and gamification.
Our findings should give pause to decision makers considering
whether to implement gamification, especially in software [26].
What lessons can platform designers, in particular those design-
ing for software developers, draw from our study? The first is that
user responses to gamification can be highly varied. We speculate
that some users respond to gamification because they would like to
signal status or commitment. Others may use gamified elements to
set and stick to goals. Yet others may learn behavior or even eval-
uate themselves by comparing their gamified achievements with
those of their friends and collaborators. In sum, any game designer
must consider that users may engage with new games in unex-
pected ways. In particular, some users may focus their efforts on
collecting points and badges to the detriment of the actual content
of their activity. This is worth keeping in mind even for designers
who seek to tweak systems and platforms to virtuous ends [30, 39].
The observed effects of the removal of the counters implies that
platform designers have some responsibility to consider how the
introduction of gamification elements steers behavior.
Indeed, some users may chase the rewards of gamification to
an unhealthy degree. Long streaks of uninterrupted contributions
may lead to burnout. Indeed, some emotional responses to GitHub’s
announcement that the streak counters were no longer part of de-
veloper profiles suggest that some developers had developed an
unhealthy relationship with these elements [9]. It also seems to us
unlikely that developers logging in to make a single contribution
to maintain an ongoing streak made useful or high quality contri-
butions. This sort of behavior reflects an optimization of individual
behavior for the sake of the game, and not for the quality of the
work. These shortcomings of the counters might have been evident
to GitHub’s designers, who, after all, removed these features from
their platform. Nevertheless, the patterns of behavior we observe
could generalize to other platforms and games. As gamification
proliferates in online platforms and labor markets, we argue it is
important to consider these findings.
5.1 Limitations
We now highlight several limitations of our data and technical
approach. The streak computation itself is very sensitive to small
changes in the source data, as a single missing day in our data
would end all streaks immediately. Fortunately we do not observe
such patterns at the macro scale. Another assumption that we make
about our data is that developers do not frequently edit the contri-
bution time of commits. In this way it was technically possible for
developers to create artificial streaks of arbitrary length. Besides
filtering out developers that were clearly engaged in such behavior
(for example those with commits at times decades before the cre-
ation of the GitHub platform), we assume that this behavior was
rare. Lastly, a more ideal natural experiment would have observed
both the introduction and the removal of the counters.
Considering our data sample, another limitation is that we only
consider developers for which GHTorrent could reliably infer loca-
tion. This is a necessary step to calculate streaks but introduces bias
to our sample, as developers who provide information about their
location are likely different in motivation, attitude, and behavior
from developers who do not. Geolocation inferences are also more
accurate for residents of major cities and Western countries [40].
We also acknowledge that developers may have moved time zones
during our period of analysis.
Finally, we note that even though GitHub removed the streak
counters from user profiles in 2016, the colored contribution graph
remains a part of profiles to this day. This gamified element gives
visitors to a profile an impression of a user’s activity over time
at a glance. In this way incentives remain to signal consistency
of contributions over time, and the calendar offers ways, if more
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limited than the counters, to track progress towards goals and for
collaborators to influence one another.
5.2 Future Work
To better understand potential effects of gamification on user be-
havior, it is important to understand how the gamified element in
question taps into different psychological motivations users have.
For example, the ability to signal commitment via a high streak
counter can be useful for individuals on the labor market, particu-
larly in software development. Yet chasing that signal can lead to
bad outcomes via single contribution days or overwork. More re-
search is needed to study how different kinds of gamification (such
as counters, leaderboards, or badges) steer behavior by appealing
to different motivations [59], for example the desire to signal abili-
ties to others [19] or to track progress towards a specific goal [25].
We know, for example, that extrinsic motivators such as points
or rewards can “crowd out” intrinsic motivations for pro-social
behavior in some contexts [6]. Any analysis of the motivation of
users should recognize that the socio-demographic backgrounds
and values of users are significantly related to their responsiveness
to gamification [21, 42].
We have not discussed how gamification elements on online
platforms may lead to biased evaluations of its users [34, 49, 65, 66].
Individual characteristics of users, such as their gender, ethnicity,
and cultural origins undoubtedly relate to their propensity to en-
gage with gamification. If gamification rewards are then used to, say,
rank top users, this can lead to run-away inequalities in outcomes
on a platform. There is a significant potential for such bias when
algorithms interact with gamified elements in a complex way [10].
Regarding the field of software development in particular, future
work should engage with the literature on engineer productivity
to design effective gamification [50]. For instance, the lessons of
recent work on goal-setting methods to foster good habits among
software developers could be applied to this question [51].
Our paper has also focused, to a large extent, on the responses of
individuals to gamification. Yet gamification is generally employed
with the goal to improve communities in some way, and sometimes
this is the primary purpose of such features [38]. Future work on
the impacts of gamification should zoom out from the individual
to study collective outcomes, for example if projects or commu-
nities that engage significantly with gamified elements perform
better [68].
5.3 Conclusion
In this paper we presented evidence from a natural experiment that
gamification steers behavior and increases participation among
software developers, though potentially in undesirable ways. We
urge the designers of online platforms to consider the potential
consequences of adding gamification elements to their sites. Our
findings suggest that some users will change their behavior to
collect digital tokens, but that this behavior may optimize for the
game, and not necessarily for healthy and productive activity.
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